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NOTE AND COMMENT

SL7B5MQUENT IMPOSSIBILITY AS ArrEcTING CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS.-

"Where the law creates a duty or charge and the party is disabled to perform
it without any default in him, and hath no remedy over, there the law will
excuse him. * * * But where the party by his own contract creates a duty
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or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided
against it by his contract." Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn, 26, a case not really
involving a question of impossibility. Most discussions of the effect of subsequent impossibility of performance upon contractual obligations start with
this often quoted statement.
With the wisdom or folly of a party's undertakings by contract the court
has no concern. That one entering into a contract should carefully consider
what he is willing to bind himself to do and limit accordingly the scope of
his promises and that ourts should, generally speaking at least, require parties to contracts to live up to their undertakings as entered into would seem
obviously to be sound policy. If all contracts were drawn by highly skilled
lawyers or perhaps even by astute business men, a strict adherence to the
second part of the statement above quoted would probably not lead to shocking results. Most contracts, however, are drawn informally and without the
most competent advice, and the law must be shaped so as to accomplish substantial justice in the normal case. The skilled lawyer probably would so
fully-and carefully hedge about the promises that it might fairly be said in
fact that the promisor intended to guarattee against contingencies not expressly provided for. The average person, on the other hand, in the usual
informal contract promises in more general terms, either not thinking of the
very unusual contingencies which might later arise to make performance on
his part either impossible or impracticable, or if actually thinking of such
possibilities considering it so obviously absurd that he should be expected
to perform despite the changed condition, that he does ifot bother to qualify
his undertaking to take care of such unlikely difficulties.
If A, after pronising to marry -B,dies before the time for performance
there is no question but that there is no liability upon A's estate for breach
of contract. This doctrine certainly applies to all cases of contracts involving
a personal relationship or personal service-the death of either party releases
the parties from their contractual undertakings. See Williams v. Butler, 58
Ind. App. 47, io5 N. B. 387, where many of the cases are referred to; Blakely v. Sousa, 197 Pa. 305. The same result is reached where illness prevents
performance of services that are personal in nature. Robinson v. Davison,
L. R. 6 Ex. 268; Spalding v. Rosa, 7I N. Y. 41; and perhaps reasonable fear
of illness may be sufficient See Lakeman v. Pollard,43 Me. 463.
Equally clear is the situation where the carrying out of the contract involves necessarily the continued existence of a certain thing, as the musichall in Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826; or the potato crop in Howell v.
Coupland, L. R. 9 Q. B. 462, i Q. B. D. 258. The fact that the potatoes in
the latter case had to be planted after the contract was made was held very
properly not to affect the situation. In Nickoll v. Ashton (1po1), 2 K. B.
126, the rule was applied in a case where the thing had not actually been destroyed, but had ceased to exist in such form as to be available for the contemplated purpose. A still further extension of the doctrine is found in the
well known Coronation Seat cases growing out of the postponement of the
coronation" of King Edward VII. In Krell v. Henry (1903), 2 K. B. 740, one
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of those cases, Vaughan Williams, L. J., said: "Whatever may have been
the limits of the Roman law, this case (Nickoll v. Ashton) makes it plain that
the English law applies the principle not only to cases where the performance of the contract becomes impossible by the cessation of the existence of
the thing which is the subject-matter of the contract, but also to cases where
the event which renders the contract incapable of performance is the cessation or non-existence of an express condition or state of things going to the
Bay
root of the contract and essential to its performance." Cf. Herne
Steamboat Co. v. Hutton"(19o3), 2 K. B.'683. See also Leiston Gas Co. v.
Leiston, etc. District Council (I916), 32 T. L. R. 588; Alfred Marks Realty
Co. v. Hotel, 17o App. Div. (N. Y.) 484, cases growing out of the World
War. In Berg v. Erickson, 234 Fed, 817, Sanborn, J., said that the Federal
courts had not gone so far as the cases referred to in this class.
There is a third class of cases in which it is also clear that subsequent
impossibility relieves the promisor of undertakings in terms absolute. Where
a railroad company acquired certain land under eminent domain proceedings
and erected a structure thereon it was held that a lessor who had covenanted
that neither he nor his assigns should erect any buildings on such land was
not liable for breach of covenant. Bailey v. De Crespigny, L. R. 4, Q. B. i8o,
a leading case in this class. There is nothing "to prevent parties, if they
choose by apt words to express an intention so to do, from binding themselves by a contract as to any future state of the law; * * * but people in
with reference to the law
general must always be considered as contracting
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trary intention ought to be pretty clear t6 rebut that presumption." Maule, J.,
in Mayor of Berwick v. Oswald, 3 E. & B. 665. To which Hannen, J., in
Bailey v. De Crespigny, adds: "To hold a man liable by words, in a sense
affixed to them by legislation subsequent to the contract, is to impose on him
a contract he never made." In Public Service Electric Co. v. Public Utility
Commrs., 87 N. J. L. 128, where the company had contracted to furnish free
lighting fir public buildings it was held a later statute making such preference unlawful excused the company from further observance of the contract. But a subsequent change in law making performance not unlawful but
only more difficult or expensive does not have the same effect. Cowan v.
Meyer, 125 Md. 459; Newport News & M. Valley Co. v. McDonald Brick Co.,
1og Ky. 408. The lawful order of public officers and bodies not amounting
to a change in law may. relieve a promisor from his undertaking. Southern
R. Co. v. Wallace, 175 Ala. 72; Melville v. DeWolf, 4 El. & Bl. 844. But
if such order does not render performance impossible there is no relief. Abbaye v. United States Motor Cab Co., 71 Misc. (N. Y.) 454.
There are cases, in which no doubt it was correctly held that performance
was excused, which do not fall within any of the- above classes. See Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, - Cal. -, 156 Pac. 458 (but cf. Runyan v.
Culver, 168 Ky. 45); Dolan v. Rodgers, 149 N. Y. 489. Professor Frederic
C. Woodward in i CoL. L. REv. 533, suggests the following as properly extending the doctrine of the three classes of case herein mentioned: "If the
contingency which makes the contract impossible of performance is such
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that the parties to the contract, had they actually contemplated it, would
probably have regarded it as so obviously terminating the obligation as not
to require expression, failure of performance should be excused."
Another group of cases not usually discussed in connection with those
above are the so-called "frustratidn of the adventure" cases. Geipel v. Smith,
L. 1, 7 Q. B. 404; Jackson v. Union Marine Ins. Co., L. R., io C. P. 125;
Dahl v. Nelson, 6 App. Cas. 38, are representative. In Horlock v. Beal (i9i6),
i A. C. 486, the doctrine of these cases we find coalescing with that of the
more familiar "impossibility" cases. See the interesting and valuable article
on "War-time Impossibility of Performance of Contract' by Arnold D. McNair in 35 LAW Q. RIv. 84.
. Though, as seen above, the courts have shown a tendency to break in
upon the rigid doctrine laid down in Paradine v. Jane, the process has not
gone so far but that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
The Col:smbus Power & Light Co. v. Columbus, Adv. Ops., Apr. 14, i919,
is to be deemed in accord with the present law. In that case the Railway
Company claimed to have been relieved of its contract obligation to furnish
eight tickets for twenty-five cents by tht action of the National War Labor
Board in raising wages of the company's employees more than 5o%, thereby increasing the operating expense of the line by about $56oooo, and leaving
the gross earnings of the company short of paying expenses, taxes, etc.
Thoughtful people observing the recent tendency of the Government in
handling wage problem's may very naturally regret that the result in the case
was not otherwise. That hard cases make bad law ,however, is all too faR. W. A.
milar.

